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Abstract
Historical, cultural and institutional factors certainly did have a positive impact on the economic growth
in South Korea and the other East Asian newly industrialising economies. However, these factors would
not have been of any importance without governmental influence. Particularly in South Korea, a strong
state with highly respected and qualified bureaucrats could play a central role in stimulating economic
growth, first by trade policy (export-push strategy), later by industrial policy and technology policy. The
most outstanding strengths of South Korean policy are flexibility, planning and implementation,
pragmatism and a close relationship between bureaucrats and industry. These close relationships with
firms and their highly respected position allow bureaucrats to monitor policy carefully and change policies
quickly.
1. Introduction
The combination of spectacular economic performance and shared growth in the East
Asian Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) attract a lot of attention. Since the
1970s the success stories of the East Asian NIEs (in first instance: Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) have become a main subject of research in
development economics. Recently, some studies convincingly demonstrated this
performance with a large number of indicators (World Bank 1993; Chowdhury &
Islam 1993; SaKong 1993). The East Asian Miracle study of the World Bank (1993)
was discussed in several newspapers and magazines (Economist 1993; FT 1993d; ESB
1993; WiWo 1994). Although there are strong controversial opinions about the
explanation of the emergence of East Asian NIEs, there is no doubt at all about their
remarkable economic development and shared growth (Vogel 1991:2). The World
Bank (1993:2) even states in its East Asian Miracle report: "if growth were randomly
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distributed, there is roughly one chance in ten thousand that success would have
been so regionally concentrated".
There are several reasons for this attention to the emergence of East Asian NIEs. First,
it is quite remarkable that this part of the world has been developing so fast
compared with other parts such as Latin America and Africa. This strong
concentration of economic growth suggests a set of common factors to be found in
East Asia, and nowhere else in the world (yet). Obviously, the possibility of applying
these factors to development in other parts of the world bears promises for large
populations, now living in poverty. Second, the emergence of the NIEs is a major
shock to the established economic powers in the world. While three powers, Japan,
Europe and the USA, are competing for world economic leadership, a fourth player,
the group of South-Asian NIEs, entered the stage. This group might perhaps not be
as large as the other three players, it is certainly one that needs to be considered by
the three traditional players.
Table 1: Asian NIEs
Economy Gross domestic
savings ratio (%)
1988
GDP per capita
($) 1988
Share of
manufacturing
(%) 1988
Human
development
index 1989
Hong Kong 33 13,380 22 0.936
Singapore 41 10,417* 30 0.899
Taiwan 33 5,739 39 0.920
South Korea 38 5,156 32 0.903
Malaysia 36 4,773 23 0.800
Thailand 34 2,908 24 0.783
Source: Summers & Heston 1991, Chowdhury & Islam 1993:5 (rest).
Note: * 1985.
NIEs can be statistically defined as countries with at least a savings ratio equal to
15%, a real GDP per capita equal to US$ 1,000, a share of manufacturing in GDP and
employment equal to 20% and a human development index equal to 0.75 (this is an
index to measure deprivation; it combines purchasing power, life expectancy and
literacy) (Chowdhury & Islam 1993:4). Applying this definition to Asia, six different
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countries, apart from Japan, satisfy the criteria: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (see Table 1).
Among the four initial industrialisers, there are large differences in economic
structure and size between the two ’city-states’ Hong Kong and Singapore, which can
be economically regarded as entrepôts with a limited domestic market, and the larger
countries Korea and Taiwan (see Table 2). This distinction certainly has repercussions
for their economic structure and policies. Thailand and Malaysia can be regarded as
the ’second’ wave of East-Asian industrialisers. Recently, a ’third’ wave of
industrialisers has appeared (for example, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, the coastal
provinces of China).
Table 2: Population and area figures
Economy Population in million
inhabitants (1989)
Area in 1000 sq. km.
South Korea 42.4 98
Taiwan 20.0 36
Hong Kong 5.8 1
Singapore 2.7 1
Source: Chowdhury & Islam 1993:8.
The employment in manufacturing has been rising during the last 30 years in all East
Asian NIEs, except Hong Kong. The extent of the structural change, however, varies
depending on the base and initial conditions. South Korea and Taiwan started with
a relatively small industrial base, and subsequently experienced large absolute
changes, while the opposite is true for Hong Kong and Singapore. The focus in most
of these countries has changed gradually from low-technology, labour-intensive kinds
of industry to capital- and skill-intensive sectors (see Chowdhury & Islam 1993:15;
Suarez-Villa & Han 1990). South Korea has reached a production structure which is
comparable to that of world leaders as the United States and Japan.
Growth in South Korea was supported by growing R&D expenditures as a percentage
of GDP (the so-called R&D intensity). It has the highest R&D intensity of all the East
Asian economies: about 1.8% in 1988 (see Figure 1), and even 2.6% in 1993
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(Swinbanks 1993). In the other East Asian NIEs the R&D expenditures as a percentage
of GDP hardly increased, and are still very low. Compared with other East Asian
NIEs South Korea is also leading as user of numerically controlled machine tools and
flexible manufacturing systems (Malecki 1991:244). Although these factors indicate the
development of South Korea as a technological power, Shin & Kim (1994:37) show
that there is a large gap between technology-input capability and technology-output
capability.
Figure 1: R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 1965-1988
Year
R&D intensity
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Source: R&D expenditures: UNESCO database; GDP figures: Summers & Heston (PWT).
Economic growth in the NIEs has a close relation with manufactured goods exports.
Export is significant for economic growth because it generates foreign exchange and
thus facilitates import of raw materials and capital goods. Besides this, outward-
oriented firms often benefit from foreign know-how (and hence boost innovation),
and must keep up with modern technology and therefore bring managerial skills up
to international standards. Exports in the East Asian NIEs are high. The growth rate
of the manufactured exports is also high, higher than the developing countries and
the world on average.
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Table 3 displays some social indicators of development in the East Asian NIEs. In
terms of infant mortality, life expectancy at birth and adult literacy rate, all four East
Asian NIEs are very close to the developed world. Because of these impressive
achievements the East Asian NIEs are sometimes labelled as the ’leaders in social
development’.
Table 3: Social indicators of development
Economy Infant mortality
1989 (per 1,000)
Adult literacy
1989 (%)
Life expectancy
at birth 1989
(years)
Income distribution
and per capita
growth rank*
Hong Kong 7 88 77 4
South Korea 24 93** 70 3
Singapore 7 87 74 2
Taiwan 5 91 74 1
Source: Chowdhury & Islam 1993:9.
Note: * Rank among 34 developing countries.
** 1984.
Since the models of the ’development state’ vary considerably among the East Asian
NIEs and are likely to diverge even more in the coming years (Douglass 1994), this
article is not dealing with the East Asian NIEs as a group, but instead is only
focusing on South Korea. The aim of the article is to investigate how South Korea has
organised (and is organising) its efforts to stimulate technological innovation in its
productive system. Two questions are of particular interest: what are the factors
behind the economic success, and can the other countries learn from South Korean
technology policy? In the next section the role of historical, cultural and institutional
factors in explaining this growth will be analysed. The role of government policy in
South Korea will be analysed in section three. Subsequently, the role of foreign
investment and the development of human resources, especially in the process of
building up technological capacities, will be illustrated. Finally, the article will give
a broad outlook on the economic future of the NIEs as well as the lessons that could
be learned from industrial and technology policy in South Korea.
This article is a rewritten part of a study MERIT has conducted in commission of the
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (Corvers et al. 1994). I would like to thank Ha-
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joon Chang (University of Cambridge, Great Britain) and Bart Verspagen (MERIT, the
Netherlands) for their helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this
article reflect only the opinion of the author.
2. Historical, cultural and institutional factors
In general, there are two main factors which are mentioned in debates on the
development of East Asia NIEs. First, there is the view that these countries are special
cases, i.e., the rapid economic growth is due to historical and cultural factors. Second,
it is argued that these countries may have had favourable historical and cultural
conditions for economic growth, but policy in these countries has converted these
conditions into rapid, self-sustained growth. This section will cover an overview of
the historical, institutional and cultural conditions, whereas the next sections will
cover the role of policy.
Both South Korea and (particularly) Taiwan experienced a long period of Japanese
colonisation before the Second World War. Some authors argue that modern
economic growth in South Korea and Taiwan owe much to the era of Japanese
imperialism (Chowdhury & Islam 1993:35). They argue that during the colonial
period, GDP grew very fast and state-directed development started (other evidence
provided by Maddison (1989), however, shows that the growth of GPD in Taiwan
and South Korea between 1900-1950 was much lower than in most Latin American
and European countries). They also point at large learning effects, particularly in the
field of the education system (Klink 1991:19). Indeed, the Japanese invested heavily
in education, infrastructure and health. However, there are several convincing
counter-arguments to this opinion. First, estimates of economic growth in this period
vary considerably, so that it is not possible to make confident statements. Second,
although the Japanese contributed to some kind of industrial take-off, one has to
consider that the industries were established to meet specific Japanese needs at home,
rather than to benefit from local comparative advantages (Chowdhury & Islam
1993:38). Third, these industries hardly remained intact during the Korean War. This
war took 1.5 million lives and destroyed two-thirds of the south’s industrial capacity
(World Bank 1993:127). Fourth, the industry which was established on the Korean
peninsula by the Japanese, was highly concentrated in the North (95% of iron and
steel, 80% of the coal industry and 85% of the chemical industry were located in the
North (Chowdhury & Islam 1993:38)).
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The massive aid East Asian nations received from the USA in the 1950s and the 1960s
is another factor which has been put forward as an explanation for modern economic
growth. These countries were mainly supported because they were in the front line
of the battle against communism. Aid inflow assisted Taiwan and South Korea to
stabilise the economies, to give local investors confidence in the viability of the
regime, to help finance land reforms and to maintain large military establishments
without becoming a major drain of resources. More crucial than the financial, military
and technical aid, were the American advisors on broad aspects of industrial society
(Vogel 1991:85). They played an important role in the shift towards export-oriented
industrialisation (Chowdhury & Islam 1993:39). However, the impact of aid depends
on the absorptive capacity of recipients and that aid-dependency is a well-known
syndrome in many developing countries. The East Asian NIEs had the capacity to use
the aid in a productive manner.
It is also very tempting to make a connection between Confucianism and economic
success. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and to a lesser extent South Korea are
heavily influenced by Chinese and Confucian values. The advantages of
Confucianism for economic development can be seen in its strong ethical and moral
basis of government, its justification of hierarchical political systems, its demand for
consensus and conformity, its particular type of community-like industrial
organisation and its co-operation between government and corporate interests
(Chowdhury & Islam 1993; Vogel 1991). Confucianism and its social harmony and co-
operation facilitate the response of entrepreneurs to policy initiatives (SaKong 1993).
Furthermore, self-cultivation and self-improvement are important ingredients of
Confucianism. These ingredients make sure that people put a high value on
education, hard work, respect for authority and achieving success in life through
moving up the social hierarchy.
However, there are also several counter-arguments that mitigate the explanatory
importance of Confucian values for the economic success in East Asia. Confucianism
has been around in East Asia for centuries, but the economies in this area have been
prospering only since the Second World War. Confucianism was in fact often blamed
for the relatively poor economic performance in the 1950s, as originally the merchant
and craftsmen occupied the two lowest castes in the traditional Confucian social
hierarchy (Chang 1993:150; Kim & Leipziger 1993:33). Besides, Thailand and Malaysia,
as the latest East Asian NIEs, do not have a Confucian tradition (Vogel 1991:83),
whereas other countries with this tradition, but with different political systems, such
7
as China and North Korea, are lagging behind the East Asian NIEs.
The characteristics East Asian NIEs share with Japan might also have contributed to
the explanation of the modern economic growth of these countries. Examples of
shared characteristics are the high population density, the lack of natural resources
and the relatively high levels of literacy of the employees, making them a highly
teachable work-force. These shared characteristics and the geographical proximity
might have enabled the East Asian NIEs to copy parts of the Japanese Model (Vogel
1991:90). These countries knew about the strategy of Japan starting with labour-
intensive industries and using the income from exports in this sector to purchase new
equipment. They also saw the prominent role of government in guiding industry.
Policy imitation was even an explicit aim in South Korea and Malaysia (World Bank
1993:80). For the Japanese, the geographical proximity enabled them to shift labour-
intensive industries to East Asian NIEs, as local wages became relatively high in the
1980s.
All these historical, cultural and situational factors cannot be more than contributory
factors to the economic success in East Asia (World Bank 1993:81), which may play
their part but only when indigenous conditions are favourable (Vogel 1991:92).
Industrial and technology policy, to which we turn now, are among the indigenous
conditions that could facilitate economic growth. However, indigenous conditions are
also influenced by historical, cultural and situational factors. Confucianism, for
instance, might have had considerable impact on the institutional framework of
industrial and technology policy.
3. Government policy as a means of structurally directing the growth path
The role of government in the economic process has been subject to much debate. All
the main arguments in this debate, in one form or another, apply to the case of East
Asian growth. In quite general terms, there are two different views on what the role
of government policy should be. One view, the liberal one, argues that the only task
for the government is to create a stable business environment, in which the free
market can do its job. In this case, policy goals include the setting-up of institutional
contexts for property-rights, labour- and capital markets, correcting ’classic’ cases of
market failures (such as positive or negative externalities), keeping down inflation (by
a balanced government-budget and a tight monetary policy), and ensuring the
exposure of domestic industry to a high enough degree of foreign competition (by
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liberalising trade).
Opposed to the liberal view are a number of more or less related frameworks,
theories, or even ideologies, which argue for a more active government. Arguments
found in this camp stress that the free market will not necessarily lead to an optimal
result, and that government has the opportunity to steer the economy in a direction
which is more optimal for the country as a whole. In general, this camp sees much
more opportunities for successful governmental intervention than the liberal camp.
In the debate around the East Asian miracle, the liberal camp is aware of the major
role the state played in explaining the emergence of the East Asian NIEs. According
to them, though, this role is confined to macroeconomic policy, in order to ’get
relative prices and/or the fundamentals right’. From this point of view,
macroeconomic policy in East Asian NIEs was praised for its performances by the
World Bank (1993). The governments of these countries maintained internal and
external balance, relatively low inflation and adjusted very quickly to external shocks,
such as the oil-crises in the 1970s (Chowdhury & Islam 1993).
However, there is general consensus among the observers of the NIEs that their
governments (except in Hong Kong) can be characterised as interventionists
(Chowdhury & Islam 1993:24; Douglas 1994). Governments have a significant
command over national income and expenditure and the contribution of public
investment to gross capital formation is quite significant. In this view, East Asian
states can be characterised by:
- an elite bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial talent in the system; few
members of this staff are (as opposed to many developing countries) subject
to corruption
- an authoritarian political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient
scope to take policy initiatives
- close government-business co-operation in the policy-making process
Some observers regard the latter as the most important part of the East Asian state.
According to this view, the close government-business co-operation converts the state
into a ’quasi internal organisation’, which can be considered as an institutional
arrangement and generator of efficient economic policies. It operates both via the
capital market and a subtle network of long-term ties (common background of
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university of bureaucrats and corporate managers). The importance of this concept,
however, should not be overstated (Chowdhury & Islam 1993:54), as it is a vague
concept and as the role of the internal capital market in quasi internal organisation
does only apply to many countries in East Asia. Furthermore, policy-making has been
put too much at the core of the co-operation. In fact, it is a matter of negotiating and
compromising between the state and the private sector. Government-business links
in policy-making are most clearly shown in export contests and deliberation councils,
to which I will turn later on.
Taking South Korea as the main example, the truth about the role of the government
in the growth process lies somewhere in the middle between the two camps
discussed above. The state did certainly not produce error-free policies. However, to
think that Korean success showed the truth of ’laissez-faire’ policies is wrong as well.
The state certainly played the role of ’handmaiden of growth’, as it created the
optimal environment for rapid economic growth by improving an essential
infrastructure. But according to Chowdhury & Islam (1993:56) and the World Bank
(1993) its limits became evident as it started to intervene in industries. The correctness
of these doubts will be analysed in the remainder of this section.
The central role of the South Korean state in economic development was only
possible because it was a strong state which could discipline firms (Amsden 1989:14).
The centralisation of economic policy-making power was in the hands of a super-
ministry, the Economic Planning Board. The Economic Planning Board had three
main functions: it planned and formulated economic policy programmes, it co-
ordinated economic policies implemented by individual ministries, and it evaluated
policy programmes implemented by individual ministries on a continuing basis (Kim
& Leipziger 1993:29). What was the basis for such strong state power?
There are some historical and cultural reasons playing a role here, such as the
absence of powerful social classes to contest state power, due to the land reform after
the Korean War (Douglass 1994:546). In addition the Confucian tradition and the long
tradition of centralisation in Korea contributed to the strength of the state. In
Confucian societies, the bureaucrat has a broader responsibility than in the West, and
enjoys more authority and respect than his Western counterparts (Vogel 1991:93; Kim
& Leipziger 1993:32). The Confucian bureaucrat, selected on the basis of merit, has
a sense of responsibility for the overall social order, including the overall moral tone
of the society. They gradually developed from bureaucrats with fear for private
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economic development which could undermine their political power, to bureaucrats
who considered the role of government in prospering the private sector. This modern
form of meritocratic bureaucracy contributed greatly to East Asia’s transformation.
Conscious actions (calculated political moves and institutional innovations) taken by
the leaders can also be regarded as important explanatory factors for the emergence
of the strong Korean state. The military regime of Park Chung-hee, who ruled from
1961 until 1979, laid the foundation for industrial policy in South Korea with its
’guided capitalism’. As a leader, he was strongly influenced by Japanese varieties of
corporatism and communism and did not pay attention to neoclassical economics.
Economic policy emphasised scale economics and large firms, the care for social
waste from excessive competition, the obsession with capital accumulation (reflected
in an anti-consumption bias), the nationalisation of banks, the desire to develop heavy
and chemical industries, the ideology of ’Renaissance of the Nation’ through the
building of ’Jarip Gyongjé’ (independent economy) and the description of workers
as ’industrial soldiers’ fighting a patriotic war against poverty.
Besides general macroeconomic policy, there are basically three different domains of
government action in which the South Korean government operated to lead its
economy on to a high growth path; trade policy, industrial policy, and, more recently,
technology policy. These three different modes will now be discussed briefly.
3.1 Trade policy
Just after the Second World War, import substitution was the main idea in South
Korean trade policy. However, it soon became clear that due to the limited size of the
domestic markets, this policy was doomed to fail. Therefore, as in the three other
early industrialising East Asian economies, during the early and mid-1960s, a policy
switch from import substitution to export-oriented industrialisation occurred
(Chowdhury & Islam 1993:74).
The World Bank (1993) is very positive about the export-led policies in the East Asian
NIEs. In fact, export-led policies are considered as the main policy factor in
explaining the East Asian Miracle by the World Bank. The state heavily intervened
to stimulate exports of certain kinds of industries with a large variety of measures,
such as direct cash payments, offering low-interest loans to exporters, permission to
retain foreign exchange earnings to import restricted commodities, permission to
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borrow in foreign currencies and tariff exemptions. In addition, South Korean state-
controlled banks increasingly used export performance as the criterion of
creditworthiness. South Korea as most East Asian NIEs combined co-operative
behaviour with competition by firms to meet well defined economic performance
criteria (World Bank 1993:93). Both in South Korea and Taiwan export contests were
organised in which competition took place to get access to credit. Using exports as
a performance yardstick was broadly shared among governments in East Asian NIEs
and is almost unique to the East Asian economies (World Bank 1993:98).
In fact, export stimulating policies were part of a whole set of trade policies, which
also included some strict protection policies and thus import substitution. The import
of machines in South Korea, for example, was heavily controlled to promote the
domestic machinery industry (Chang 1993:135). Trade policy in South Korea was
characterised by a subtle combination of selective import substitution and
compensating export promotion (Suarez-Villa & Han 1990:274). Exporting
manufacturers were supported by refraining them from paying import tariffs for
capital goods they needed to import (Klink 1991:68).
In general, successful macroeconomic policies and trade liberalisation have been
linked with each other in the East Asian NIEs (World Bank 1993). Exchange rate
policy and the fiscal and monetary tools to carry it out became a part of an overall
export-push strategy.
Both in trade policy as well as in industrial policy government-business links have
been playing a significant role in devising and conducting policies in South Korea.
From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, government-business links were close,
although some in the private sector argue that government was too dictatorial (World
Bank 1993:183; FT 1994b). Government and business leaders met often and regularly.
Government listened to business’ views and included them as a critical policy
component. Until the early 1980s, the main communication channels were the
monthly export-promotion meetings, at which the president of South Korea himself
presided over discussions between the economic ministers and top business leaders.
With Korea’s gradual democratisation since the mid-1980s, relations between
government and business have become more distant and the meetings less frequent.
There is a recognition, though, for the need to reestablish good relations but under
a new form of collaboration. Relative power in that form is likely to be more
balanced.
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3.2 Industrial policy
Although all East Asian NIEs have some kind of industrial policies, South Korea can
be regarded as the most interventionist country (Amsden 1989; Chang 1993). Chang
(1993:13) stresses the priority that has been given to industrial policy by the
government as he states: "macroeconomic policy measures were seen as ineffective
for the rapid upgrading of the industrial structure, owing to their uncertain impact
on specific sectors, and were consequently given a status secondary to industrial
policy".
The South Korean government introduced so-called Five Year Plans, in which sectors
with high productivity growth potential were identified as ’promising strategic
industries’ and were financially and technically supported. By having large control
over the financial sector, the government was able to channel investment funds to
these industries. In return for the support priority industries received from the
government, they were also heavily controlled by the state. By using a tight
performance monitoring system (with an obligatory reporting system), the state was
able to collect detailed and up-to-date business information, which is essential for an
effective industrial policy.
The heavy and chemical industrialisation (HCI) drive, which was launched in the
third and fourth Five Year Plan (1971-1981), can be regarded as the most prominent
example of ’promising strategic industries’ in Five Year Plans. The impact of this
drive on economic growth in South Korea has been subject to controversial
discussions (Klink 1991:35; World Bank 1993). Chang (1993:137) is positive about its
effects as he argues: "the (..) evidence suggests that the HCI programme, far from
being a failure, produced impressive growth and trade performance, especially in the
heavy industries".
As the debate around the performance of centrally planned economies has shown, an
important drawback of strong state intervention in industry is that it may protect, or
even encourage, inefficient producers. Indeed, South Korea is not different from other
countries in that industrial policy has created many inefficient firms. "However, what
differentiates Korea from other countries is that the Korean state has been willing and
able to withdraw from support whenever performance has lagged" (Chang 1993:148;
see also Kim 1993:363; Kim and Dahlman 1992:442 and Amsden 1992:80). The state
penalised poor performance and rewarded good performance. Thus, it forced many
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inefficient firms, even the economically and politically powerful large firms, into
mergers or even liquidation. In fact, the state pushed and pulled firms with threats
and promises (Kim 1993:363). Such state discipline, combined with the strategy of
industrial upgrading, acted as a powerful incentive for firms to enhance their
technological capabilities. The discipline has been a painful process of continuous
bargaining and conflict between the state and the private sector, which sometimes
had to be solved by forceful measures which are difficult to imagine in other
countries.
Although industrial policy did not harm competitiveness and innovativeness of
industries in general, there might be one (important) exception. Intervention caused
some imperfections on the capital market (FT 1993b; Klink 1991:35). Banks did not
search for profitable projects in non-priority industries as they knew that these
industries were not supported by the state. In addition, banks tended to neglect small
and medium-sized enterprises (Regnier 1993:31). Thus the development of an
innovative banking sector was hampered by industrial policy.
This general picture of industrial policy in South Korea has strong similarities with
the Japanese model (Klink 1991:71). Examples are the provision of credits to exporting
industries, the stimulating of large firms by supporting promising strategic industries,
restructuring and rationalising policies by mergers or liquidation and the strong links
between government and industry. One important distinction is that in Japan banks
were more powerful and autonomous than the banks in South Korea which are much
more linked to the government.
3.3 Technology policy: a reaction to changing circumstances
In the 1980s, industrial interventionism in South Korea was gradually replaced by
functional interventionism (Kim & Leipziger 1993). On the one hand, the government
tried to deregulate the financial sector by denationalising commercial banks, although
with limited success (Chang 1993:152). On the other hand, the government tried to
intervene less in industries, because the economy had become too complex and the
large conglomerates increased their political power. The seventh Five Year Plan (1992-
1996) even aims at transferring power from government to business and make the
Korean economy ’business-led’ rather than ’government-led’ (Amsden 1992:71). A
policy of economic democratisation was initiated to lessen the monopolistic abuses
of the large diversified conglomerates, the chaebols (FT 1993a). However, many
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chaebols bought some shares in state banks and the growth of economic
concentration could not be stopped. Although the government was aiming at
functional interventionism, it was still rationalising and restructuring less promising
industries, stimulating high-technology industries and it became more active in
fostering R&D in the economy (FT 1993c).
These policy changes during the 1980s can be seen as a reaction to the challenges of
the totally different economic environment South Korea was faced with. South Korea
lost part of its competitiveness in low wage based labour-intensive industries.
Moreover, industrialised countries became increasingly reluctant to transfer
technology to South Korean industries (Swinbanks 1993). Therefore, the South Korean
government had to stimulate indigenous technological and innovative capabilities
(Kim 1993; Kim & Dahlman 1992). The focus of industrial policy changed from
stimulating strategic industries to innovation-related activities, especially R&D and
human resources. A new administrative mechanism, the quarterly Presidential
Council on Science and Technology, reflected the increasing importance government
was giving to innovation-related activities (Swinbanks 1993). This Council has to
improve co-ordination between the two ministries involved in science and
technology.
Other measures to increase competition are the bringing down of import tariffs in
order to make the domestic market more competitive and the liberalisation of
technology transfer policies, which enabled an increase in foreign direct investment
and licensing. Furthermore, small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly
technology-oriented small firms, were stimulated in order to get a more balanced size
distribution in industry (Regnier 1993). The state provided special industrial parks for
small and medium-sized enterprises, whereas banks were forced to provide a
minimum percentage of their loans to small and medium-sized enterprises.
The South Korean science and technology infrastructure played a very small role in
promoting the development of industries with mature technologies in the 1970s (Kim
1993:364). The institutes were poorly linked with industry, not only because well-
trained scientific and academic researchers in these institutes lacked manufacturing
know-how, but also because of the lack of relevance of research in firms in the 1970s.
Industries in South Korea reversed the sequence of research, development and
engineering; they started with engineering for products and processes imported from
abroad, and then progressively started with development. In the 1980s public
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research establishments could increase their role in basic research (Swinbanks 1993):
they received 90% of research grants awarded by the government in ’new’ technology
areas (Kim 1993:372). In contrast, higher education institutes in South Korea do play
only a minor role in (basic) research (Swinbanks 1993; Crow & Nath 1992:123).
In the 1970s, indirect instruments, such as education and export promotion, were
much more effective in transferring foreign technology in the case of mature
technologies, than direct instruments (promotion of R&D) (Kim & Dahlman 1992:445).
In the absence of demand for technological change, direct instruments were
ineffective to strengthen the supply of technological capability.
The shift in government policy to R&D, in fact the shift from industrial to technology
policy, partly led to a sharp increase in R&D expenditure in the private sector in the
1980s (Kim 1993:369; Swinbanks 1993). The share of public R&D expenditure in total
R&D expenditure decreased from 68% in 1971 to only 20% in 1987, whereas the share
of private R&D expenditure increased (Kim 1993:370). The chaebols dominate these
private R&D activities. Furthermore, employment in high-tech industries has been
growing rapidly since the mid-1980s, mainly in the Seoul metropolitan region (Park
1991:423).
The South Korean government has set up an infrastructure to contribute to financing
private R&D expenditure (Kim 1993:372). First, preferential financing for corporate
R&D by state-controlled banks and public funds is the most important mechanism
for funding corporate R&D; more than 90% of total corporate R&D financing by the
state goes to this mechanism. Second, direct R&D subsidies were introduced for the
first time in the 1980s. Third, tax incentives are a major indirect mechanism in making
funds available for corporate R&D.
Rapid industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s and the rise of high-tech industries in
the 1980s have caused strong concentration of economic activities in the Seoul
metropolitan region and therefore considerable regional disparities (Park 1994:540).
In order to achieve both structural transformation of industries and a more balanced
regional growth, the South Korean government started to establish science parks in
the 1970s. Taeduk Science Park was established in 1973 in the neighbourhood of the
city of Taejeon, south of Seoul. This Park, modelled after the research triangle of
North Carolina, now has fifteen public research establishments and eight private R&D
centres which employ in total 12,300 people (Park 1992:31). Although the park led to
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an increase in business services in Taejeon, no significant linkages with industries in
the region have been established (Park 1992:34). Another nine cities in South Korea
have developed plans to set up science parks. In contrast to the South Korean science
parks, science parks in Singapore and Taiwan (Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial
Park) are more focused on stimulating international technology transfer (Gwynne
1993; Courtenay 1993).
The latest technology policy initiative of the South Korean government is the Highly
Advanced National (HAN) programme which was launched in 1992 (Shin & Kim
1994; FT 1994b). The purpose of the project is to increase the competitiveness of
domestic industries by increasing the science and technology capability. It aims to
promote increased R&D activities in 11 areas of technologies, such as electric cars and
high-definition television, until 2001. The HAN project should force companies to
spend more on R&D and it should avoid wasting of R&D resources by stimulating
co-operation between industries and research institutes on projects. The project has
been criticised by companies as another example of ’command capitalism’ (FT 1994b).
Many scientists and business executives believe that the state should focus its funding
on basic research, while allowing industry to pursue pre-competitive research with
less government interference.
3.5 South Korea’s big business; the chaebols
As the South Korean government only wanted to support industries with a certain
minimum scale of efficient production (especially during the heavy and chemical
industrialisation drive), it intentionally created large companies, the chaebols. A
chaebol is a group of firms owned and controlled primarily by a single entrepreneur
and usually his family members (SaKong 1993:61). The four largest chaebols are
Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and Lucky-Goldstar. The chaebol is similar to the pre-
war Japanese zaibatsu, except that it does not have its own bank. Chaebols do have
large influence on the increasing number of small and medium-sized subcontractors,
which are heavily dependent on them (Regnier 1993:33).
All chaebols are diversifying in the same kind of industries, so that a fierce
competition between these companies takes place, also with regard to bidding for
governmental support. Despite their wide diversification, chaebols are characterised
by a strict hierarchy and a high degree of central control (Porter 1990). Recently the
South Korean government have forced the 10 largest chaebols to reduce their broad
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product range by forcing them to choose three core industries (FT 1994c).
The chaebols, the main private R&D investors in the South Korean economy, are
characterised by a variety of technology sourcing strategies (Kim 1993:375). First, they
have invested heavily in in-house R&D activities. The four largest chaebols accounted
for most of the nation’s total industrial R&D. They can recruit the top graduates from
the best universities. Leading scientists and engineers at R&D centres of these
chaebols are nearly all foreign-educated PhDs (Porter 1990:466). Second, they have
developed closer links with local public research establishments. Third, they have set
up outposts in Silicon Valley, in order to attract the knowledge of highly qualified
Korean-Americans. This strategy has been used by the largest chaebols to start the
production of new industries, such as semi-conductor production, microelectronics
and biotechnology. These outposts are used both as ’antennae’ for new research
findings, and as training centres for South Korean researchers and engineers. Fourth,
the chaebols have successfully developed strategic alliances with multinationals in
order to benefit from their basic research (Table 4).
Table 4: Total number of strategic alliances of the largest chaebols at corporate level (including
subsidiaries)
chaebol before 1980 1980-1984 1985-1989
Hyundai 3 9 19
Lucky-Goldstar 0 15 16
Samsung 2 11 14
Daewoo 1 2 11
Source: MERIT-CATI data bank
According to Porter (1990:471), perhaps the most unique feature of South Korean
large companies is an impressive willingness to take risks. The sources of this
willingness may lie in its problematic history (Japanese occupation, Korean War and
therefore personal hardship), which led to a feeling that there was nothing to lose.
One has to take into account, however, that the government, through the banking
system, was willing to allow firms to take these risks.
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4. Foreign investment, human resources and technological capabilities
Thus, South Korea, under the guidance of its strongly interventionist government,
built up an impressive technological basis for its economy. What was the role of
foreign direct investment and technology transfer in this process? Compared with the
other NIEs, the size of foreign direct investment in South Korea was very low. This
reflects the explicit policy of promoting ’Jarip Gyongjé’ and independence from
multinationals in management control (Kim 1993:360). In South Korea, the state
regards the assimilation of advanced technology by domestic firms as a vital
condition for an effective industrial upgrading (Chang 1993:141; Amsden 1989:21).
This meant a tight control over foreign direct investment and even (although to a
lesser extent) over technological licensing. In contrast to companies in other East
Asian NIEs, South Korean firms are less original equipment manufacturers-orientated
and more willing to invest in marketing and in-house technology (Porter 1990:467).
Thus, foreign direct investment had a relatively small impact on the acquisition of
technology in South Korea. National companies were acquiring technologies from
abroad by licensing and importing machines and by the procurement of turnkey
plants in the early years. The government stimulated the import of selected, and
certainly not all, machines which became a major source of learning through reverse
engineering by South Korean firms. Many firms in South Korea are still dependent
on imports of machines and other inputs (Suarez-Villa & Han 1990:281). According
to a survey among high-tech industries in South Korea in 1989, 64% of technology
sophisticated materials were purchased from abroad (Park 1991:424). This dearth of
supporting industries in South Korea is regarded as one of the biggest problems of
the current South Korean economy (Kim 1993:382; Porter 1990:470; FT 1993a; Waitt
1993:204; Regnier 1993:33). Chaebols have mainly focused on end-products depending
to a large extent on imported parts and machinery.
The insignificance of foreign direct investment implies a strong domestic basis for
technological development. During the early stages of industrialisation, the
importance of the group in Confucian societies helped to create an easily adapting
worker, who is willing to accept a limited role for labour unions and refrain from
making great personal demands (Vogel 1991:100). This gave South Korea, as well as
other NIEs and Japan, a major cost-advantage in international markets, and thus
helped to build up its strong position in low-tech industries. However, as
governments and industry saw the need to gradually shift from labour-intensive, low-
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tech industries to more skill-intensive, high-tech industries, investments in education
were needed at the same time, in order to improve the stock and quality of human
resources (Chowdhury & Islam 1993:19). The South Korean government certainly
succeeded in developing human capital, as it is regarded as the most important factor
in building up a strong domestic basis for technological development. According to
Kim & Dahlman (1992:441) "a large part of South Korea’s success in acquiring,
diffusing, improving and developing technology in the mature stage is due to its
heavy investment in human resources".
The Confucian moral helped developing human capital, as it induced people to make
great efforts in educating themselves. The ’examination hell’ does not only count for
Japan, but for many East Asian NIEs. Young people in these countries tend to study
hard, as they know about the specific link between entrance examinations and good
jobs (Vogel 1991:97). They get good jobs, not because of their family or property, but
through passing examinations. School systems are measured by the success of their
graduates in passing examinations, which pushes them to high quality teaching. By
breaking down the feudal connections, the exam systems allow all members of the
society to feel that they have access to high positions (Vogel 1991:98). This ensures
that the most talented people in the society are trained and channelled into key
positions. Porter (1990:465) states that among the industrialised countries South Korea
is characterised by the strongest commitment to education by parents and the private
sector (see also Malecki 1991:365).
Although the share of education in the government budget in the East Asian NIEs
has increased, the total expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP has not
been higher than elsewhere (World Bank 1993:198). The difference is the high share
of public expenditure on education allocated to basic education. This has been
consistently higher than elsewhere. By giving priority to expanding primary and
secondary bases of the educational pyramid, East Asian governments stimulated the
demand for higher education, while relying to a large extent on the private sector to
satisfy that demand. In contrast, many other low- and middle-income economies
stressed public subsidies to university education. Because of the higher concentration
on basic education in East Asia, public funds for education are more likely to benefit
children of low-income families. Despite the large efforts of the South Korean
government in establishing a sound educational system, Kim (1993:371) observes too
much emphasis on teaching and neglected research. Giving the teaching orientation,
there is a fundamental lack of interplay between the universities and the private
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sector (Kim 1993:374).
The relatively high expenditures on primary and secondary education are reflected
in the rise in enrolment figures for South Korea and other East Asian NIEs (Table 5).
The East Asian economies have also been faster to close the gap between male and
female enrolments (World Bank 1993:45). A measure of school quality is the
performance of children on tests of cognitive skills. East Asian children tend to
perform better than children from other developing regions and even, recently, better
than children from high-income economies (World Bank 1993:70).
Table 5: Human resource development
Number enroled (% of age group)(*)
Primary Secondary
1965 1987/1988 1965 1987/1988
South Korea 101 101 35 88
Hong Kong 103 106 29 74
Singapore 101 104 45 69
Malaysia 90 102 28 59
Thailand 78 95 14 28
India - - 27 41
Brazil - - 16 38
UK - - 66 83
Japan - - 82 95
Sources: World Bank 1993:45,46; Chowdhury & Islam 1993:20; SaKong 1993:236.
(*) = The numbers can be above 100, as some pupils in school for an extra year do not belong to
the age group any more.
5. Future outlook and policy lessons
According to Porter (1990: 685), South Korea can be seen as the most advanced
country of the East Asian NIEs when it comes to his development model. Whereas
other countries are still in the factor-driven phase, South Korea is in the investment-
driven stage, as South Korean firms aggressively invest in modern process technology
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and large-scale production. In fact, South Korea is even on the threshold to the
innovation-driven stage. The key challenge lies in how to achieve innovation-driven
development. This is not only a matter of changing firms and industries, but also of
the internal institutional framework. The strong state has facilitated the development
from factor-driven to investment-driven development, albeit with considerable social
costs. This framework seems in some ways appropriate and in other ways
inappropriate in contributing to the ongoing innovation-driven development.
A distinction must be made here between macropolitics and micropolitics. The latter
focuses on the firm (relations between workers and managers). The distinction
between mass production and flexible specialisation can be put forward in this
respect (Piore & Sable 1984). Mass production is the feature of factor- and investment-
driven development, flexible specialisation is the feature of the innovation-driven
development. Mass production is characterised by hierarchical relationships, both
between managers and workers and between firms and suppliers (top-down
governance structure). Flexible specialisation is characterised by more autonomy of
the worker and therefore higher skill requirements (decentralised governance
structure). Chaebols are managed in a manner that reminds us of the management
of mass production companies in the 1960s, i.e., companies are hierarchical and
characterised by a high degree of central control. It is questionable whether this
corporate structure will benefit the South Korean national competitive advantage in
the future (Porter 1990:473).
With regard to macropolitics, the strong state fits well with the characteristics of mass
production firms, but the transition of firms into flexible specialisation has to be
accompanied by a transition of the institutional framework. Chowdhury & Islam
(1993:254) state with regard to this respect: "Emphasis has to shift from mass
production to flexible specialisation, from hierarchical control to decentralised
governance, both at the level of the state and at the level of the firm". The state has
to create an environment in which firms can be innovative and dynamic. Its role has
to change from actor and decision-maker to facilitator, signaller and pusher, which
means that it has to decrease direct intervention. It is hard for any government
accustomed to an activist role to make this change. Decentralised governance not only
means a less interventionist central state, it also means a geographical decentralisation
of power to regions, as it can be seen in the theories of Fordism and post-Fordism.
Whether East Asian NIEs can face the challenge of innovation-driven development
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depends on the ability to transform micro- as well as macropolitics from hierarchical
in a more decentralised and networking governance. Each of the NIEs are now at its
own crossroads (Douglass 1994:558). Whether these countries can get into this new
phase depends on the success of democratisation movements in creating an
institutional environment which encourages diversity and creativity (Chowdhury &
Islam 1993:27). Although current unrest among the labour force in South Korea point
at some frictions arising from the problems of adjusting to success, the recent
democratisation process, which was put forward by president Kim Young-sam, gives
hope for the future (FT 1993a; FT 1994a).
Despite the fact that policies are in a transition phase, some lessons on fruitful
communication between business and government could be learned from NIEs. The
World Bank (1993:185) states in its East Asian Miracle report on the possibilities of
copying forms of government-business communication: "deliberation councils (formal
institutions that facilitate communications and co-operation between the private and
public sector) naturally reflect the history and culture of the society in which they
operate. Even so, the experience in the high-performing Asian economies suggest that
their applicability is not limited, as some analysts may suggest, to the Confucian
cultures of Northeast Asia".
In Korea, regular talks between captain of industries and bureaucrats take place, so
that policy measures can aim at the needs of large firms. The establishing of public
research establishments which are closely linked to the needs of the chaebol is an
important example of the impact of these talks. Also in other countries, such as the
Netherlands and Germany, regular consultation between policy-makers and business
takes place. However, in these countries deliberation takes place between institutions
which are representing employers and employees, whereas in South Korea
deliberation councils consist of captains of industry and policy-makers. Because of the
direct consultation between captains of industry and policy-makers in South Korea,
industrial and technology policy is biased towards large enterprises, whereas in
Germany and the Netherlands technology policy has been criticised for neglecting
specific needs of large enterprises.
Despite the strong influence of business opinion on policy-making, South Korean
policy-makers are not afraid of changing a certain strategy without consulting
businesses as soon as the strategy seems to be a failure. This attitude is possible
because of the powerful position bureaucrats South Korean have in society. In
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Western Europe, bureaucrats do not have this position. The South Korean model
could be regarded as a top-down model with strong bottom-up inputs.
However, policy-makers in other countries could not only learn from Korean
industrial and technology policy, the Koreans could also learn from policy in other
countries. The Korean policy-makers could particularly look at policies in Western
Europe focused on small and medium-sized enterprises. The strong influence of
captains of industries in deliberation councils in Korea led to the neglecting of small
and medium-sized enterprises in industrial and technology policy (Regnier 1993). The
technological upgrading of these enterprises in Korea could be stimulated by financial
programmes and regionalised technology transfer networks set up in order to foster
the diffusion of new technologies.
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